Earnings Dynamics and Firm-Level Shocks by Friedrich, Benjamin et al.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation 
4-1-2019 





Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Friedrich, Benjamin; Laun, Lisa; Meghir, Costas; and Pistaferri, Luigi, "Earnings Dynamics and Firm-Level 
Shocks" (2019). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 82. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/82 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
By 
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO.
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.yale.edu/
EARNINGS DYNAMICS AND FIRM-LEVEL SHOCKS
Benjamin Friedrich, Lisa Laun, Costas Meghir, and Luigi Pistaferri
April 2019
2175
Earnings Dynamics and Firm-Level Shocks∗
Benjamin Friedrich† Lisa Laun‡ Costas Meghir§ Luigi Pistaferri¶
April 20, 2019
Abstract
We use matched employer-employee data from Sweden to study the role of the firm
in affecting the stochastic properties of wages. Our model accounts for endogenous
participation and mobility decisions. We find that firm-specific permanent productivity
shocks transmit to individual wages, but the effect is mostly concentrated among the
high-skilled workers; firm-specific temporary shocks mostly affect the low-skilled. The
updates to worker-firm specific match effects over the life of a firm-worker relationship
are small. Substantial growth in earnings variance over the life cycle for high-skilled
workers is driven by firms accounting for 44% of cross-sectional variance by age 55.
Keywords: Income process, Wage dynamics, Firm dynamics
JEL-codes: H51, H55, I18, J26
∗We thank the IFAU for providing the data and supporting the project. We are grateful to participants in seminars at the
SED, University of Chicago, Northwestern, IFAU, NBER Summer Institute 2016, and the Conference in honor of Joe Altonji
for valuable comments. We thank Joe Altonji, Peter Arcidiacono, Thibaut Lamadon, Anders Forslund, Greg Kaplan, Magne
Mogstad and Emily Nix for fruitful discussions and comments. Costas Meghir thanks the Cowles Foundation and the ISPS for
funding. All errors and interpretations are our own.
†Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management
‡IFAU
§Yale University, IFS, NBER, IFAU, CEPR and IZA
¶Stanford University, NBER, CEPR, SIEPR and IZA
1 Introduction
How important is the firm in which a worker is employed in determining wages? And
how much of the wage fluctuations over an individual’s career reflect fluctuations in firm
productivity? These questions are important for understanding the sources of inequality
and of risk that individuals face over the lifecycle.
A number of papers have addressed the former question, starting with Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis (1999) as well as more recent papers such as Card, Heining, and Kline (2013).
However, there is very little work addressing the extent to which fluctuations in the firm’s
fortunes pass on to wages, in part because of the formidable data requirements. In this paper
we study how idiosyncratic wage shocks are related to fluctuations in firm-level productivity
shocks. This relates directly both to the amount and sources of risk faced by individuals
and to the competitiveness of the labor market, making it an issue of first order importance
from a number of perspectives.
Related directly to this question are the pay policies of firms in frictional labor markets
(Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002b, Lise, Meghir, and Robin, 2016, for example). This research
agenda partly reflects developments in search theory (starting with the seminal models of
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)), which stress depar-
tures from perfect competition and the law of one price. The causes of pay heterogeneity
also underlie the reasons why workers may, under certain circumstances, share shocks to firm
productivity.1
In general, workers face multiple sources of risk distinct from their own productivity
shocks.2 Consider for instance fluctuations in the fortunes of the firm, induced by product
1Of course pay heterogeneity for the same worker across firms does not require search frictions: com-
plementarities between worker and firm productivities will imply such heterogeneity as in a Becker-style
marriage market, although in the absence of search frictions it is hard to understand why we would observe
workers moving across the quality distribution of firms, which in practice happens frequently.
2Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) illustrate the importance of such distinctions for understanding the
welfare effects of risk.
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market shocks. In a competitive labor market, workers only bear the risk of shocks to their
own productivity, which they carry with them wherever they work, and they bear them
fully. However, in the presence of search or financial frictions, the response of wages to
individual and firm-related shocks may not be straightforward. On the one hand, individual
productivity shocks may not affect wages immediately (for example if firms offer implicit
contracts smoothing wages in the face of variable productivity). On the other hand, the
worker may have to share some of the shocks to the productivity of the firm itself, since
their immediate outside option is unemployment and thus he may not have a credible threat
to quit. This issue relates to whether workers share rents with the firm, and an early study
in this direction is van Reenen (1996). Indeed, in a recent paper Lamadon, Mogstad, and
Setzler (2018) show how the pass-through of firm level shocks to wages reflects wage-setting
power.
The existing literature has focused on sorting, and explains wage determination in the
absence of firm-related shocks. The transmission of productivity shocks to wages has been
examined before by Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2016), who, however, do not use matched
employer-employee data and restrict themselves to the implications driven by a specific
structural model. More recently, Lamadon (2016) has developed a structural model with
directed job search that offers a theoretical framework for understanding the role of firm
level shocks for worker outcomes.
In an earlier paper, Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) estimate the pass-through of
firm level shocks onto wages using Italian matched employer-employee data and interpret
the results as estimates of the amount of insurance the firm provides. However, their ap-
proach is limited by the fact that they ignore job-to-job mobility and the transitions between
employment and unemployment.3 Such transitions may well hide the impact of firm-level
3Subsequent work by Carlsson, Messina, and Skans (2016) has distinguished industry-level and firm-level
shocks, but maintains the focus on stayers at incumbent firms.
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shocks on wages because a worker may quit or switch jobs instead of suffering too large a
pay cut, causing wage growth to be censored.
In this paper we remain agnostic about the specific structural model that generates the
data. We build on the literature modeling the stochastic structure of earnings.4 We extend
the framework considered by the earlier papers by using matched employer-employee data
and using information on firm level shocks to explicitly identify the extent to which they can
explain individual wage fluctuations. In this way we go beyond the existing literature and
identify different sources of risk, including individual and match-specific productivity as well
as firm level shocks. To avoid biases due to censoring we explicitly allow for the endogeneity
of transitions between employment and unemployment as well as between jobs.
In a related paper, Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) find that making job mobility
and employment choices endogenous reduces the estimated variance of permanent shocks
compared to earlier studies. In their model, firms are represented as a fixed matched hetero-
geneity effect. However, because they do not observe firms they are not able to measure the
impact of shocks to firms separately from worker productivity shocks. They do, however,
infer indirectly the amount of heterogeneity that can be attributed to the workplace. A
related paper is Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2013), who specify a model of employment,
hours, wages and earnings in order to distinguish between different sources of risk. Selection
into employment and between jobs is modeled in a similar way as in Low, Meghir, and Pista-
ferri (2010). While both studies allow for some firm-related variation in wages, they do not
consider the role of firm-level shocks for earnings dynamics, which is the main contribution
of the present paper.
Our data are drawn from Swedish administrative records. We have matched these records
with data on firm balance sheets. The result is the universe of workers and firms, matched to
4See Abowd and Card (1989), MaCurdy (1982), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Guvenen (2007) and more
recently Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2013).
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each other for the years 1997-2008. The data include annual earnings, detailed information of
job histories, including the identity of the firm and other important information. However,
it does not include hours of work. We thus focus our main analysis on men, who rarely
work part-time. We allocate individuals to two education groups: those with some college
education and those with less.
We specify a model of earnings, employment and job mobility, all of which are interre-
lated. Specifically, wage shocks drive entry and exit from work, while mobility is allowed to
depend on wage improvements between the incumbent and the poaching firm. The stochastic
structure of wages includes idiosyncratic effects, reflecting changes in individual productivity
and match-specific effects. The latter consist in part of shocks to firm productivity (tran-
sitory and permanent) as well as individual match effects. As such, it is a particularly rich
framework that effectively nests earlier specifications of the stochastic process of income.
We find that firm productivity is quite volatile and that this volatility transmits to
wages of high skill workers to a larger extent, particularly when it relates to permanent
shocks. It thus turns out that the firm is responsible for a high fraction of cross sectional
variance of wages attributable to unobserved components and interpreted as uncertainty.
The same is not true for unskilled workers: transitory shocks to productivity transmit to
wages, but overall this does not explain a large fraction of the wage variance. We also find
that employment is strongly related to wage shocks, consistent with self selection into work
and work incentives. Finally, job mobility is highly dependent on wage offers, although other
factors lead workers to take wage cuts when they move across workplaces.
To better understand the implications of our main findings, we simulate the model in a
number of counterfactual scenarios in which we change the nature of wage variability over
the life cycle. In one scenario, we eliminate any pass-through of firm shocks onto wages;
in another, we shut down any form of firm influence on wages (both match productivity
effects as well as firm shocks pass-through). We find that wage variances over the life
4
cycle decline substantially when eliminating the impact of firm shocks, and less so when
match productivity shocks are eliminated (with the effect being particularly relevant for
the high skilled). In another set of counterfactual experiments, we eliminate selection by
preventing job-to-job moves or quits into unemployment. If workers cannot move or quit
(which are extreme forms of labor market frictions), shocks stay with them longer and cannot
be avoided, resulting in higher variances over the life cycle. We show that this is mostly due
to pass-through of firm-specific shocks. Hence, workers’ dynamism (the ability to quit into
unemployment or move to alternative employers) represent an implicit form of insurance
against labor market risks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model of the income process.
Section 3 introduces the dataset and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the
estimation and identification strategy. Section 5 shows the main results for the two-stage
estimation procedure and their implications for our understanding of where labor market
risks come from. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Stochastic Structure of Earnings
2.1 Overview
At the heart of the specification is a wage equation for each of the two education groups
we consider (some college or less). Our focus is on wage growth over the life cycle. We thus
allow for a stochastic structure of wages that depends on general productivity shocks, which
follow the worker wherever he is employed to the extent that they are persistent. Wages
also depend on match-specific effects (relating to the specific worker/firm combination), and
possibly on shocks to firm-level productivity, which is the central question of our paper. Our
administrative data does not measure hours of work and thus we do not distinguish between
earnings and wages, terms we use interchangeably.
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An important feature of careers is mobility between employment and out-of-work as well
as between jobs. Selection into and out of employment and mobility between jobs may be
driven, at least in part, by shocks to wages. Ignoring this link may cause a serious bias in
the measurement of the impact of firm level shocks, since large adjustments are effectively
censored by individual behavior: individuals who may suffer large pay cuts as a result of
productivity shocks, may quit into unemployment or are more likely to accept alternative
job offers. We thus allow for endogenous employment and mobility and relate this directly
to wage shocks.
2.2 The Statistical Model
Wages We consider a quarterly model for wages, employment and job mobility. The
quarterly frequency is designed to capture the effects of job mobility and the associated
wage changes. If we were to focus on annual frequencies, there would be too few moves and
the model would miss a key source of wage dynamics.




i,tγ + Pi,t + εi,t + vi,j(t0),t, (1)
where x are observable worker characteristics such as age, education, and experience.
We assume that εi,t ∼ N (0, σ2ε ) is an i.i.d. transitory productivity shock,5 and Pi,t is
5Note that we assume no measurement error because we will use high quality administrative data for
estimation. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) point out the inability to disentangle the variance of the transitory
shock, the variance of the measurement error and the parameters of the transitory process in a similar
setting. The distinction has economic implications, however, since measurement error is pure noise while
transitory shocks reflect uncertainty that may give rise to economic responses. The authors suggest two
ways of handling this issue: obtaining bounds for the unidentified variances or using an external estimate of
the measurement error (from validation data) to recover the variance of the transitory shock. In practice, if
some of the transitory variation in wages that we estimate reflects measurement error, the main effect will
be an overstatement of transitory risk.
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permanent productivity, specified as:
Pi,t = ρPi,t−1 + ζi,t




where P init is the initial productivity draw upon entry into the labor market. If ρ = 1 we
have the standard random walk assumption for the permanent component of wages. The
productivity shock is denoted ζ and we make the distributional assumptions
Pinit ∼ N (0, σ2P )
ζ ∼ mixture of Normals(µζ1 , σζ1 ; µζ2 , σζ2 ;λm)
(3)
where µζs , σζs s = 1, 2 represent the mean and standard deviation of each of the two normals
in the mixture, while λm is the mixing parameter. By allowing for a mixture of normals we
are able to fit higher order moments of the distribution of wage growth, such as the observed
kurtosis. The importance of higher order moments in earnings growth has been examined
in the context of US data by Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan et al. (2019). Earlier papers that
consider a mixture of normals for income processes include Geweke and Keane (2000) and
Bonhomme and Robin (2009). One interpretation of the mixture is that on occasion workers
draw a large wage change, possibly representing promotions or other important changes;
another is that a non-negligible fraction of workers experience no wage growth from one
period to the next. These features of the model turn out to be important empirically.
The identity of the firm affects wages through the match-specific productivity term
vi,j(t0),t. We assume that the match effect evolves stochastically as a result of firm- and
match-specific shocks. It is useful to distinguish between a component that reflects perma-
nent (or at least long-run persistent) changes in the value of the worker/firm match, and
one that reflects transitory changes. Within that context we will introduce the way the firm
7
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while the transitory part of the match component equals:
vTi,j(t0),t = κ




The initial draw of the permanent match productivity (at time t0) in equation (5) is:




Thus we assume that the initial match value of a job is affected by fixed firm characteristics






Notice that with this specification we are not modeling sorting on permanent worker
and firm characteristics. However, our focus is on wage growth moments and even if there is
sorting based on permanent characteristics our estimates are not biased because these effects
difference out once we consider log-wage changes. Of course, they may matter for explaining
wage levels.
8
In equations (5) and (6), the terms ξPj,t and ξ
T
j,t are permanent and transitory shocks to
the productivity of the firm, respectively. The properties of these shocks will be measured
directly from the firm level data. The two ψ shocks are i.i.d. normal. Specifically we assume





, for l = {P, T}. By allowing for these match specific shocks that are
unrelated to firm level productivity we guard against the possibility that the productivity
shocks just proxy for such effects.
The existence of a match-specific effect has been motivated theoretically within the search
and matching framework by, among others, Topel and Ward (1992). Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis (1999) use French employer-employee data to show that match-specific effects
matter empirically. Most studies on earnings dynamics, however, have not explicitly modeled
the firm side. Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) include a match-specific component in the
wage process, but in their paper the match is not allowed to change within the firm-worker
relationship and is not subject to shocks that could be related to firm-level productivity.
Thus, in their model, wage growth does not depend on the identity of the firm.
These additions to the match-specific component are one of the contributions of our work
compared to earlier studies. The other key part is that some of the evolution of the match
component may mask rent sharing. In our framework, these two are kept distinct, which is
an important deviation from earlier work. Our framework is general enough that it nests
previous characterizations of the role of firms in wages. If κP = 0, the persistent part of
the match component evolves independently of the firm’s fortunes; if σ2ψP = 0 the match
productivity component changes only in response to firm-related permanent shocks.
Employment and Job-to-Job Mobility In thinking about the dynamics of earnings,
a key issue is controlling for selection into work and for job mobility, both of which may
truncate the distributions of shocks. For example, if there is a large pass-through of firm
level shocks onto wages, the worker may actually quit his job rather than suffer the resulting
9
pay cut, which may even be permanent. Similarly, workers with large pay cuts in firms
that have had bad productivity shocks may be more likely to accept alternative job offers.
Observationally, there may be two workers paid exactly the same - one of whom moves, while
the other does not - just because of the different reasons for observing a pay cut. In one case
it may be because of an adverse firm level shock, while in the other a negative individual
productivity shock that is carried everywhere.6





Pi,t + εi,t + vi,j(t0),t
)
+ uEi,t > 0
}
. (8)
The decision to work depends on the stochastic component of wages Pi,t+εi,t+vi,j(t0),t. A
more general specification not pursued here would allow a different impact of the transitory
and the permanent components because the former only causes substitution effects, while
the latter also causes wealth effects (see Blundell, Pistaferri and Saporta-Eksten, 2017).
The coefficient φ in part reflects the incentive effect of working but also the importance
of unobserved heterogeneity in participation choices.7 In other words, in the absence of
exclusion restrictions that would allow us to distinguish the causal impact of wages from
heterogeneity this coefficient captures both. This is sufficient for our purposes of controlling
for censoring due to labor market transitions. Other observable wage components (as well
as taste shifter variables such as age) are summarized in z.







+ uJi,t > 0
}
, (9)
and is also affected by a set of variables z, such as age. Job mobility depends only on the
6Positive shocks work in reverse, lowering quits and reducing the likelihood of a move to an alternative
employer. We discuss below that allowing for asymmetric effects appears not to affect our findings much.
7By participation we always mean employment versus non-employment. We use the terms interchange-
ably.
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difference in match values between new and incumbent firms, (viniti,j(t),t − vi,j(t0),t), and not
on the remaining stochastic components, because permanent and transitory productivity
shocks do not depend on a particular firm match but are portable characteristics of a worker
across different jobs. The importance of wage differences as opposed to worker observable
characteristics in determining mobility is captured by the parameter b.
Finally, both the employment and the mobility equation depend on stochastic shocks,
respectively uE ∼ N (0, 1) and uJ ∼ N (0, 1). These shocks reflect exogenous job destruction
and mobility (or lack thereof) due to unexplained random factors. In other words workers
may move to unemployment despite an attractive wage or may move to a job paying less
than the current one for unobserved reasons, or indeed may not move despite an excellent
alternative offer. The two stochastic components also reflect unobserved tastes for work or
job mobility. Finally, the observed characteristics in the two equations also reflect labor
market attachment and employment and mobility costs.
Labor Market Frictions and Job Offers Upon entry in the labor market, workers
receive job offers at a rate λentry. In subsequent unemployment spells, job offers are received
at an age-dependent rate λU = λU,0 + λU,1 · age. The age dependency is, of course, testable.
Job offers while employed are subsumed into age-dependent mobility preferences in equation
(9), since the two cannot be separately identified. If a worker receives a job offer while
employed, we also model the origin of the offer to match transition patterns across broad
categories. We classify firms according to their sector and size, and we assume that the
probability of new offers from any given sector and size group depend on the current job,
i.e.:









This specification can capture the empirical fact that two-thirds of job-to-job moves occur
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within the same sector and 50% across similarly sized employers, see Table 8 for details.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis uses a matched employer-employee data set that combines infor-
mation from four different data sources, compiled by Statistics Sweden. The first is the
Longitudinal Database on Education, Income and Employment (LOUISE) that contains in-
formation on demographic and socioeconomic variables for the entire working age population
in Sweden from 1990 onward. We use information about age, gender, municipality of resi-
dence, number and ages of children, marital status, education level as well as the collection
of public transfers such as disability, public pension, sickness, unemployment and parental
leave benefits. All variables in LOUISE are available on a yearly basis.
The second data set is the Register-Based Labour Market Statistics (RAMS), containing
information about the universe of employment spells in Sweden from 1985 onward. On the
worker side, RAMS includes the gross yearly earnings and the first and last remunerated
month for each employment/firm spell, as well as firm and plant identifiers. On the firm
side, RAMS includes information about industry and the type of legal entity for all firms
with employees.
The third data set is the Structural Business Statistics (SBS), which contains accounting
and balance sheet information for all non-financial corporations in Sweden from 1997 onward,
and for a subset of corporations during the 1990–1996 period.
The final data set is the Unemployment Register, containing all spells of unemployment
registered with the Public Employment Service.
Since the SBS covers all non-financial corporations in Sweden only from 1997 onward,
we focus the analysis on the period 1997–2008. The sample includes all firms with the legal
entity being limited partnership or limited company (other than banking and insurance
12
Table 1: Summary statistics, firms
Firm size: number of employees
5–20 20–50 50–100 100+
A. Construction
No. unique firms 15,527 984 195 142
Value added per worker 486,027 528,201 558,381 576,954
Growth, log V.A./worker 0.0363 0.0372 0.0390 0.0247
B. Manufacturing
No. unique firms 14,373 2,705 1,080 1,166
Value added per worker 515,661 577,966 621,752 1,018,796
Growth, log V.A./worker 0.0290 0.0208 0.0130 0.0123
C. Retail
No. unique firms 27,013 2,245 554 403
Value added per worker 507,697 624,140 633,776 760,339
Growth, log V.A./worker 0.0291 0.0245 0.0260 0.0206
D. Services
No. of unique firms 45,637 3,931 1,015 832
Value added per worker 553,601 654,343 841,577 771,384
Growth, log V.A./worker 0.0368 0.0399 0.0439 0.0327
Note: Value added per worker is in real SEK for base year 2008.
companies), and we exclude sole traders because data for these firms are not available for
the entire period. The final sample represents 84 percent of value added and 86 percent of
employment in the Swedish non-financial private sector over the 1997–2008 period.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the firms in our data set. The data includes
almost 120,000 unique firms and 920,000 firm-year observations. The four sectors construc-
tion, manufacturing, retail and services account for 15%, 18%, 27% and 40% of all firms in
the sample, respectively. Within sectors, larger firms display, on average, higher value added
per worker. For construction and manufacturing, larger firms grow more slowly on average,
whereas growth rates are more similar across firm size in the other sectors.
We include all individuals who work at firms in our sample at some point during the
1997–2008 period. We use the data from RAMS together with registrations of unemployment
at the Public Employment Service to define employment on a quarterly basis. We use daily
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unemployment records to measure the exact length of employment spells. For individuals
with multiple jobs during a quarter we keep the main employment, defined as the employment
that accounts for the largest share of quarterly earnings. We define a worker as employed
if he is working at least 2 months for any employer during the quarter. In each quarter,
we record if an individual is a job mover, a job stayer or an entrant from non-employment.
Average monthly earnings are recorded based on the yearly earnings and the number of
remunerated months as registered in the RAMS data.
We exclude individuals until the last year that they receive public study grants (typically,
young workers at the beginning of their working life who are still completing their formal
education). We also exclude individuals from the first year that they receive disability
benefits, occupational pension or public pension benefits (typically, workers at the end of
their working life). We further exclude individuals when they move to a workplace that is not
in the firm sample (typically, these are moves to the public sector, a financial corporation,
or self-employment). Importantly, however, we keep all the records of non-employment that
are in connection with employment spells at the firms in our sample.
In this paper we focus on men only. Results for women are much harder to interpret
given that earnings variation reflects changes in both hours and productivity.8 We estimate
the model separately for each of two education groups: workers with at most high school
education (“low skill”) and workers with at least some college education (“high skill”). We
take as given education choices and restrict our estimation sample to individuals age 26-55
for both education groups.
8In 1997 (our first sample year), the part-time employment rate (defined as the fraction of employed
workers who work less than 30 hours per week in their main job) was 6.5% for men and 23% for women; in
2008, the rates were 10% and 20%, respectively (source: OECD). For women of child-bearing age, it is also
more frequent to observe shifts from full-time to part-time work and vice versa, making the analysis of wages
volatility in administrative data much more challenging. In an earlier working paper version of the paper,
we documented that earnings variances for women exhibit a hump-shaped pattern over the life cycle (unlike
the growing pattern documented below for men). Given these differences, we defer the study of women’s
earnings dynamics to future work.
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Table 2: Summary statistics, Male workers
≤High school College
No. unique workers 1,152,933 464,616
No. worker-quarter obs. 31,091,423 11,188,448
Monthly earnings 24,960 35,930
(2008 SEK) (8,009) (17,115)
Age 40.31 39.07
Married 0.5797 0.6112
Having children 0.4569 0.4985
Employed, of which 0.8764 0.9040
Job stayer 0.9547 0.9493












Table 2 presents summary statistics for each group of workers. Workers with lower
education are on average slightly older, which reflects changes in years of schooling across
cohorts. Workers with lower education are also less likely to have children living at home. The
employment rate increases with education, but the fraction of employed workers who remain
at their current job each quarter is fairly constant across groups. More educated workers are
more likely to move from job to job, and less likely to enter a new job from non-employment.
The data indicate that job-to-job mobility and transitions between employment and non-
employment are fairly common. Each quarter, 2–3 percent of employed workers change jobs
and around 2 percent enter employment after a period of non-employment.
15
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Life-cycle earnings Table 2 also reveals some important differences in earnings across
education groups. We take a more detailed look at life-cycle earnings profiles in Figure 1,
using observations for different birth cohorts in the data. In particular, for each education
group we construct five-year cohort groups and separately plot their average log earnings
over the age span in which we observe this particular cohort. The vertical distance between
earnings of different cohort groups at a given age can then be interpreted as cohort effects,
while the overall slope of the profile can be interpreted as reflecting age effects (ignoring for
simplicity the usual age, time, cohort identification issues).
Overall, we observe the familiar life-cycle earnings profile increasing quite rapidly early
in the career and then flattening or slightly decreasing towards the end of the life-cycle.
Level-differences show the absolute gain from achieving a higher level of education. There
seem to be some modest, but positive cohort effects (with new cohorts being more productive
than older cohorts at each point of the life cycle).
The first moment of earnings may give only a partial description of the life cycle evolution
of earnings. Figure 2 presents the evolution of the variance of residual log real earnings,
obtained after removing year and age effects. The patterns here display striking differences
between education groups. While for the higher education group the variance increases by
age, as has often been noted in US data (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004), for lower education
16

























20 30 40 50 60
Age
























20 30 40 50 60
Age
Some college
men the variance is either flat or increases at a very low rate. The lifecycle variance profile
for those with some college is consistent with a random walk (or possibly heterogeneous
age profiles). However the profile for those with high school or less is more consistent with
stationary wages over the life cycle. Hence within-group inequality is increasing among the
higher educated, but not among the lower educated.
Participation and job transitions The top-left graph in Figure 3 presents the employ-
ment rate by age for each education group. In our sample employment rates are above 75%
for all age groups. The lower the achieved level of education, the lower is participation at
young ages. Interestingly, there is an increase in participation from the beginning of in-
dividuals’ careers until their mid-50s for high-school graduates, whereas participation for
workers with some college education quickly levels off at around 90%. The figure also shows
a substantial drop in employment after age 55 for both education groups, which justifies our
sample selection choice of focusing on workers younger than 55.
The bottom panels of Figure 3 shows that young workers across both education groups
have high quarterly job separation and re-entry rates when out-of-work. Low-educated work-
ers face higher separation rates and lower re-entry rates at young ages. The entry rate from
non-employment is rapidly falling with age and comparable across education groups around
17
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Table 3: Share of between firm wage variance
At Least Some College High School or Less
Year Log Earnings Residual Log Earnings Residual
1997 37.09% 38.44% 38.74% 35.57%
2000 38.96% 39.95% 37.19% 35.01%
2004 42.32% 40.64% 38.28% 36.21%
2008 42.06% 40.70% 38.70% 36.60%
Proportion of the cross sectional variance attributable to variation between
firms. Residual refers to the variance after controlling for age and cohort
effects, within each education group.
age 35, but the respective separation rates are higher for low-educated workers. As a result,
the share of unemployed workers differs across groups. As the employment, separation and
re-entry rates illustrate, transitions in and out of employment are an important feature of
the labor market.
The top-right panel in Figure 3 presents the quarterly job-to-job transition rates by age
for each education group. The frequency of job to job transitions is particularly high at
younger ages. Workers with at least some college switch employers more frequently than less
educated workers.
Table 3 reports the amount of earnings variance that can be attributed to differences
between firms.9 The results show that most of the variance of earnings is, in fact, within
firms. For low skill workers this remains stable over time. However, for high skill workers the
share of between firm variance is increasing over time. This increase is in line with recent
findings by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) for Germany and motivates the investigation of
the role of firms for wage inequality and wage dynamics in our paper.
Mobility and Wages In Table 4 we describe mobility patterns between firms sorted by
the average wage they pay, and describe the way wages change between jobs when mobility
9We obtain these values by a standard decomposition of the total wage variance into between- and
within-firm contributions.
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does not involve an unemployment spell in between jobs, separately for low- and high-skill
workers. We compare wage growth in the year before the job move to the year after the
job move, conditional on no other transition happening in this three-year window. Among
job-to-job movers about 48% of low skill workers and 46% of high skill workers move to
a firm of the same wage quartile level; in both groups, slightly less than 30% move to a
higher-paying firm, and about a quarter to a lower-paying one.
Table 4: Job Mobility and Wage Growth
Low skill workers
Departing firm quartile
Share of transitions Log wage growth Share wage cuts




1 0.145 0.071 0.038 0.014 0.063 0.026 –0.004 –0.021 0.337 0.409 0.482 0.475
2 0.068 0.110 0.058 0.016 0.116 0.048 0.035 0.008 0.261 0.346 0.401 0.452
3 0.041 0.077 0.144 0.042 0.168 0.083 0.051 0.034 0.199 0.278 0.323 0.391
4 0.019 0.026 0.048 0.081 0.184 0.127 0.092 0.066 0.198 0.232 0.283 0.322
High skill workers
Departing firm quartile
Share of transitions Log wage growth Share wage cuts




1 0.114 0.050 0.033 0.016 0.099 0.056 0.044 –0.020 0.294 0.343 0.363 0.464
2 0.060 0.107 0.067 0.022 0.134 0.094 0.083 0.056 0.211 0.246 0.294 0.360
3 0.036 0.080 0.152 0.061 0.177 0.113 0.085 0.064 0.187 0.218 0.275 0.354
4 0.023 0.033 0.062 0.085 0.186 0.153 0.140 0.100 0.217 0.216 0.232 0.310
Note: Firms sorted based on average wage paid
On average, movers experience positive wage growth, unless they move from the very top
firms to the very bottom ones (in terms of wage quartile). However, this average experience
is masking a very large number of wage cuts: for both groups of workers between 20%-
50% experience some wage cut when moving from one firm to another. The size of the
wage cut depends very much on the direction of the move. Our model allows for such wage
cuts: the motive for changing jobs, expressed in equation 9, trades-off wage improvements
to other observed and unobserved reasons for mobility. However, many search models do
not allow for wage cuts: The Burdett-Mortensen wage posting model excludes them, unless
one rigs the model to force some random transitions. The model by Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002a) does allow for wage cuts: the worker may choose to move to a firm where the match
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surplus is higher; he may wish to pay for this move in terms of a lower upfront wage because
of the option value of future wage increases. Finally, in Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2016)
wage movers are either improving their match or are moving away from a firm that has
suffered a productivity shock. This formulation allows for a much more flexible relationship
between wage changes and mobility. The large prevalence of wage cuts surrounding job-to-
job mobility is an indicator of the importance of such shocks in determining mobility and
our model allows us to assess this.
4 Estimation Strategy
The estimation of the model is complex because of the combination of dynamics, en-
dogenous selection into work and mobility and the unobserved factor structure. To address
these complexities, we proceed in three steps. First, we estimate the stochastic process of
firm-level productivity and treat the results as an input into the model estimation. Second,
we estimate wage residuals based on a model that accounts for selection into employment
and that allows for the fact that we take job mobility at a quarterly frequency but observe
earnings annually, unless there is a change in employer. Finally, we estimate the full model
using simulated method of moments based on the wage residuals, quarterly transition rates
and firm-level shocks.
4.1 Firm Productivity Shocks
The source of stochastic variation that we are directly interested in are the productivity
shocks to firms. We distinguish between permanent and transitory shocks because we can
expect them to have very different impacts on wages. For example in a world with adjustment
costs on either wages or employment we can expect the firm to smooth over transitory shocks
but consider adjustments in response to a permanent change (see also Guiso, Pistaferri, and
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Schivardi (2005)).
The key point is that by observing data on firms we are able to measure shocks to
their productivity directly (instead of relying on proxies such as employment, which may
be subject to inaction bias due to the presence of adjustment costs). We can then relate
these shocks to wages, since firms are also matched to individual records. Our measure of
productivity is log value added (VA) per worker, which is observed annually.
We first run a regression of log VA per worker controlling for industry, municipality, firm
size, and year fixed effects, and save the residuals of this regression. Thus the shocks to firm
level productivity that we use are purely idiosyncratic and do not include economy-wide,
regional, scale or industry effects. This ensures, that what we estimate to be a transmission
of firm level shocks to individual wages, will not be confounded by common shocks to workers
in the same industry. In Table 5 we show the autocovariance structure of firm productivity
across all firms and separately by industry. From these results it seems that a random walk
with an i.i.d. transitory component is a good approximation of the stochastic structure of
VA per worker because the second and third-order autocovariances for productivity growth
in the data are close to zero for all sectors.10
Based on this empirical pattern, we assume that the stochastic process of log productivity







10While some of these autocovariances are statistically significant, they are economically negligible (in all
cases considered, second- and third-order autocovariances are an order of magnitude smaller than first-order
autocovariances).
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Table 5: Autocovariance of log Value Added per Worker: Data
Value Added per Worker: Data
All firms Construction Manufacturing Retail Services
Var (∆At) 0.1791 0.1603 0.1469 0.1698 0.2078
(0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Cov (∆At,∆At−4) -0.0537 -0.0587 -0.043 -0.0487 -0.0602
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Cov (∆At,∆At−8) -0.0041 -0.0005 -0.0045 -0.0049 -0.0048
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Cov (∆At,∆At−12) -0.0022 -0.0036 -0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0024
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
















In the data, we can only construct annual productivity (while our model is quarterly) which
means we cannot identify an MA component within year. We denote annual productivity
by eAt , where t refers to the first quarter of the relevant year, and the annual measure can
be related to the underlying quarterly measure by
eAt = eat + eat+1 + eat+2 + eat+3
where we drop the firm subscript j for convenience.
We apply simulation-based estimation to estimate the quarterly firm-shock process.







and simulate firm productivity for a set of hypothetical firms.
We then aggregate these simulated shocks to replicate the structure of the actual data. The
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quarterly shock process for log VA per worker is additive. As a result, the annual log VA


























































The important point is that the initial conditions drop out of the expression. To estimate
the parameters of the productivity process we define a set of auxiliary moments that can
be easily computed in the data as well as from the simulation. We choose the structural
parameters that minimize the distance between these moments in the model and in the data.
In particular, we identify the underlying parameters of the shock process from the variance
and first-order autocovariance for the annual change in firm productivity.
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the standard deviations of the shocks on a
quarterly basis. The implied process for quarterly value added per worker shows sizable
transitory shocks, which are similar across industries: this implies considerable mean rever-
sion. However, the permanent shocks are also substantial, implying quite volatile firm level
productivity. This in itself is an important result and consistent with what Guiso, Pistaferri,
and Schivardi (2005) find.11 These estimates will be used to draw firm shocks in the simula-
11If we shut down the transitory shock, the annualized standard deviation of the permanent shock is 21.2%.
Similarly, the annualized standard deviation of the transitory shock is 24.6%.
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Table 6: Results: Quarterly Firm-Shock Process
All firms Construction Manufacturing Retail Services
σξT 0.4758 0.4804 0.4335 0.4598 0.5021
(0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0027)
σξp 0.1303 0.1003 0.1199 0.1319 0.1442
(0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Standard errors obtained using the bootstrap.
tion estimation procedure below. There are some interesting differences between industries,
with services being most volatile.
One issue concerns measurement error. It is not possible to distinguish measurement
error from the variance of the transitory shock. This means that we may well be overstating
the variance of the transitory component. This will imply understating the transmission of
the transitory shocks to wages. Under the assumption of orthogonality of transitory and
permanent shocks however, the pass-through coefficient for permanent shocks is unaffected.
4.2 Wage Residuals
In the next step, we use individual-level wages and labor market participation to estimate
the effects of individual characteristics on wages (γ) in equation (1). Based on this first
stage, we can then use the wage residuals ẽt = (Pi,a,t + εi,a,t + vi,j,a,t) as the relevant input
into the model estimation. In what follows we use interchangeably earnings and wages.
The administrative data does not include information on hours, so to the extent that some
fluctuations reflect changes in hours of work during the work spell we will not be able to
distinguish this from other sources of fluctuations. This point may be particularly pertinent
for women, which is a reason why we do not model their income process in this paper and
focus only on men.
The estimation applies a modified Heckman two-step procedure that accounts for selec-
tion into work and for the discrepancy in data frequency between model and data. In the
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model, we assume that all decisions of individuals and firms happen at a quarterly frequency.
Yet, in the data we only observe wages as an annual average over all quarters. As a result,
our observed outcome variable in levels is the average quarterly wage for those who have






where tq is the q quarter in year t and the binary indicator Etq = 1 denotes working in that
quarter.
We start by estimating a discrete choice model for employment (Etq) for each individual
at a quarterly frequency and construct the Mills ratio (λMtq ) for each of these periods. To
make the model consistent with the data, we aggregate these quarterly selection correction
terms in the annual wage model. If the error term follows a log normal distribution, the log
of the conditional expectation of observed average quarterly wages is given by
logE
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where again we omit the firm subscript j and we take the x characteristics as constant
within the year (for simplicity). The last term in this equation explicitly shows the bias
from aggregating individual wage information at annual frequency, even though wages are




will be absorbed by





. This term implies that seasonality of participation decisions can
introduce a second bias when running a simple linear specification of log wages on individual
characteristics, even when controlling for selection. If some of the decision criteria for partic-
12This aggregation bias term is reminiscent of the bias due to individual heterogeneity in Blundell, Reed
and Stoker (2003) when analyzing aggregate wages.
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ipation ztq change at quarterly frequency, a nonlinear specification is needed that accounts
for seasonal changes in participation when aggregating employment choices to the annual
level. The estimation approach based on equation (12) then controls for these two sources
of aggregation bias that occur because of data availability and can be used to get consistent
estimates of γ.
Equation (12) is estimated separately for our two broad education groups (less than
college and some college or more). Within each category there are more detailed educational
levels (i.e., grades completed) and we control for these as well as a fourth-order polynomial
in age. Since our selection equation also includes demographic characteristics, which we
do not wish to use as exclusion restrictions, we also include marital status and dummies
for children in different age groups as well as region-fixed effects. Industry by time effects
are included to control for aggregate and industry trends. Finally, we acknowledge the role
of measurement error in employment. For example, it is quite common for individuals in
Sweden to receive some payments from their employers while on parental leave. If these
payments are sufficiently high, then those individuals will be falsely considered employed
and will appear as particularly bad working types in the data even though they should be
considered out of work during that period. These cases would lead to overestimating the
amount of low-productivity types in the labor market and will bias the estimation results.13
In order to address this type of measurement error, we directly include controls for parental
leave and sickness benefits.
The same set of control variables used in the wage equation are also included in the par-
ticipation choice equation, but we use region-time fixed effects in the quarterly participation
equation as excluded instruments to estimate the selection effect. These instruments are
motivated by the fact that income taxes in Sweden are determined at a community level
13Note that the familiar result of consistent estimates despite measurement error in the dependent variable
does not apply for the participation equation because we estimate a nonlinear model. See Hausman (2001)
for more details.
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and the cost of living, in particular housing or rental prices, differs widely across regions and
over time. As a consequence, the opportunity cost of work differs across regions and time.
However, we assume that the labor market is integrated and that, other than fixed regional
effects and time effects, the interactions can be excluded (see for example Blundell, Duncan,
and Meghir (1998)). We use the residual from the estimated participation regression, ũt to
construct some key moments for identification (detailed next).
4.3 Full Model Estimation
4.3.1 Simulation
We estimate the remaining parameters defining individual careers and wages using the
simulated method of moments (McFadden, 1989, Pakes and Pollard, 1989). Each set of
parameters is estimated for the lower and higher education groups separately.14 The approach
requires us to simulate wages and career paths, including transitions between employment
and unemployment and between jobs.
Conditional on a guess for the parameter vector, we simulate life-cycle behavior and wages
for 40,000 workers in the model. Specifically, we draw from the distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks to determine the stochastic evolution of individual productivity (which is estimated
simultaneously with the entire model) and from the distribution of permanent and transitory
firm level shocks, which we pre-estimated. To construct the firm level shocks, such that
a large number of workers receive the same ones (because they work together) we need
to allocate workers to firms in the simulation. To do so, we create two firm identities
for each size/sector bin. The model generates offers for each of these bins, based on the
probability model (10). We then allocate the individual randomly to one of the firms with
14We list these here for convenience: the parameters determining participation (δ and φ), job-to-job
mobility (θ and b), the transmission of firm-related shocks (κP and κT ), the parameters of the stochastic
processes determining wage dynamics (ρ, σ2P , µζ1 , σ
2
ζ1











ψinit), the job arrival
rate coefficients (λentry, λU,0, λU,1) and the coefficients determining the source of outside offers (ω0, ω1, ω2).
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equal probability. The population of workers within a firm then receives a permanent and
transitory firm shock drawn from the distributions that were estimated in advance before,
as described. The key point is that we have groups of workers with the same shocks; this
will allow us to use the observed spatial correlation of wages within a firm to identify the
transmission coefficients.
In the simulation some workers may receive an offer immediately after education and
others do not. The model includes a probability of this event as a parameter, which is
estimated by matching it to the actual proportions in the data. The initial source of the job
offer reflects the sectoral distribution of employees by education group in Table 2. However,
in this version of the paper we do not allow the stochastic properties of wages to differ
systematically by sector.
Once we simulate these career paths we compute moments from the simulated data to
match them to those from the actual matched employer-employee dataset. In doing this
we aggregate data from a quarterly to an annual frequency whenever needed to match the
observed data. The wages in the data are the residuals we constructed earlier.15
The moments simulated from the model mimic the moments we compute from the data
and hence any sample selection is controlled for. In order to exactly replicate the data
structure in the simulation, we use the empirical age distribution by education group as
weights to compute the simulated moments from the model. We repeat this full life-cycle
simulation procedure for 20 independent samples of workers and firms to further increase
precision.
The full set of moments is described in the section below.
15This aggregation step requires aggregating in levels and then taking logs to maintain the properties of
the wage shock process.
29
4.3.2 Data Moments and Identification
This section describes the choice and computation of the data moments to estimate the
model. In particular, we emphasize challenges because of different data frequencies. Since
different moments simultaneously contribute to pin down the structural parameters, the
identification discussion in this section is naturally informal.
The first set of moments we use are quarterly participation and job mobility rates by age
group.16 These help identifying the deterministic part of the participation and job-to-job
transition equations (δ and θ). The second set of moments includes quarterly job creation
rates (fractions moving into work from unemployment) and job destruction rates (fractions
moving from employment to unemployment) for the same age groups as above. Moreover,
we use job to job flows towards firms of similar size and industry. The job creation rate
relates to the arrival rate of offers by age (λU,0 and λU,1) and the distribution of initial
offers (λinit). Quarterly job transition rates across sectors and firm size groups are directly
related to the on-the-job offer probabilities (ω0, ω1 and ω2). The shift over the life cycle of
job mobility flows is crucial in estimating the impact of differences in firm-specific matches
on the probability of a job-to-job move (the parameter b in equation (9)). The covariance
between wage residuals and participation residuals (obtained as described in section 4.2)
pins down the association between wages and work decisions (φ).17
Quarterly job separations are endogenous and directly relate to transitory and permanent
wage shocks. To distinguish “general” from “match-specific” wage shocks, we add annual
moments related to wages. Since the model assumes quarterly processes for all shocks,
all simulation outcomes are quarterly as well. As a result, we need to aggregate simulated
outcomes such as firm shocks and wages within each year to make the simulation comparable
16 The age groups we use are 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55.
17This coefficient will be a function of both the causal impact of wages on participation and of the covariance
of the errors, reflecting a composition effect on employment. Without exclusion restrictions these two effects
cannot be disentangled. However, it does allow us to deal with censoring due to employment, whatever the
interpretation of the coefficient.
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to the observed moments. Specifically, we use the variance and autocovariance of wage
growth for stayers. The first-order autocovariance pins down the contribution of transitory
fluctuations, leaving the variance, skewness and kurtosis of wage growth to identify the
contribution of more persistent shocks (including the parameters characterizing the mixture
of normals).
We further distinguish match-specific and individual-specific shocks by comparing average
wage growth for stayers and movers. Wage information in transition years is not very reliable
because we often do not know the exact timing for job-to-job mobility. We therefore choose
not to use wage information for these years and instead use mover information by looking at
residual wage growth across years before and after the switch occurred. We focus on workers
with only one job move between periods t−1 and t+ 1, i.e. we compute, {ε}jj = ẽt+1− ẽt−1.
We then use this residual wage growth measure to determine average wage growth and the
variance of wage growth for movers, which in turn will be informative about the variance of
match-specific effects (σ2ψinit).
We target the level of residual wage variance at the beginning of the life cycle to identify
the variance of initial productivity (σ2P ). The size of the autocorrelation coefficient in per-
manent productivity (ρ) is identified through the life-cycle pattern of the variance of residual
wages.
Some of the key structural parameters are the pass-through of firm-level shocks onto
wages. To identify these parameters, we measure the share of variation in wage growth that
is due to variation across firms, i.e. the share of wage growth explained by a common factor,







l∈j,k 6=l(∆ẽkt −∆ē)(∆ẽlt −∆ē)
V ar(∆ẽit)
∑
j nj(nj − 1)
where ∆ẽ is residual wage growth and ∆ē is average residual wage growth across all firms
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and workers. We complement this moment with the autocovariance of average wage growth
among stayers to capture the mean reversion of transitory firm-level shocks. These two
moments are closely related to the structural pass-through parameters κP and κT .
4.3.3 MCMC Estimation
We maximize the GMM objective function





Wn (β) (gn (β))




i=1mi (β) and mi (β) is a vector of differences between simulated mo-
ments ΓS (β) and data moments ΓD such that
E [mi (β0)] = E
[
ΓD − ΓS (β0)
]
= 0.
The concerns raised by Altonji and Segal (1996) are particularly pertinent for our context,
where we are estimating variances. As a result we use an equally weighted distance criterion,
which we minimize to obtain our parameter estimates.18 Since the simulated moments may
not be smooth, we use a Laplace-type estimator (LTE) following Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003) to obtain this minimum. The main computational advantage of the LTE approach
is that it uses functions of the criterion function that can be computed by Markov Chain
Monte Carlo methods (MCMC). In particular, we use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm





18Wage moments that are calculated across the entire age distribution are weighted by a factor of 6 to
give them equal importance as the job transition moments we compute separately by 6 age groups.
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and evaluate this function at the current parameter guess β(j) and at an alternative draw χ
from a multivariate normal distribution. The parameter guess is then updated according to:
β(j+1) =


































In practice, we estimate 100 chains of 40,000 elements per education group and we use the
last 20,000 elements to compute β̂MCMC .
19
This estimation strategy is a good fit for our problem because MCMC only requires many
function evaluations Ln (β) at different parameter guesses. The method is derivative-free and
can deal with large parameter spaces and multiple local minima quite well.20
To estimate standard errors we use the sandwich formula. Normally, the variance of the
MCMC chain would provide an estimate of the variance of the parameters if the weights used
in the method of moments criterion function were the optimal ones. But we use a diagonally
weighted approach. The estimated covariance matrix has the form
19The first 10,000 elements of the chain are computed based on a preset error variance. For the subsequent
chain, we use adaptive MCMC to target the asymptotically optimal acceptance rate of 23.4% (Roberts,
Gelman, and Gilks (1997)).
20See the discussion in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) for more details.
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is the gradient matrix evaluated
at the estimated parameter vector β̂. Finally, Ê denotes an estimated expected value.
We obtain estimates for G through simulation. We first calculate each element j of the











where g is the vector of moments that we evaluate at β̂ + hj and β̂ − hj respectively, in
our case the vector of participation rates, mobility rates, wage growth moments, spatial
correlation of wage growth etc. Lastly, hj is a vector of zeros with one positive element at
the j-th position equal to 1% of the parameter value θ̂j, the j-th element of the vector of
parameter estimates.




, which turns out to be the most com-
plex component: this is because of the combination of serial and spatial correlation combined
with the large number of observations and the huge combination of workers that can find
themselves in a particular firm. While it is relatively straightforward to deal with either spa-
tial correlation or serial correlation, doing both is intractable. We thus decided to simplify.
For all moments other than the spatial correlation we allow only for within individual serial
correlation, which is likely to be a very important source of dependence; in our calculation
of the standard errors we ignore the within firm spatial correlation of residuals; allowing
for both sources would have been straightforward with the bootstrap, but the estimation
procedure is far too slow for this to be feasible. For the spatial correlation coefficient we
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assume all variation is between firms. While the simplification may underestimate our stan-
dard errors, the size of our data set is so large that this shortcut is unlikely to make much
of a difference. The standard errors we compute are very small in general. We show in an




Our model is overidentified and consequently considering the fit of targeted moments can
be informative on the performance of the model. In Figure 4 we plot the actual and fitted
cross sectional variance of wages, conditional on fixed effects that have been differenced out
when we constructed the wage residuals. These are replicated extremely well, showing a
growing variance over the lifecycle for the high education group and a flat one for the lower
one.
Then in Table 7 we show the dynamic moments of wage growth; overall the fit is excellent.
Some autocovariances show sign reversals, but they are all very close to zero and this is
inconsequential.21 When it comes to the moments relating to job movers (J = 1), we only
consider the growth in wages that occurs between the year before the move and the year after
the move, as explained above. This eliminates the effects of measurement error in the exact
data of the transition. The relevant statistics (the conditional mean E(ẽt+1 − ẽt−1|Et−1 =
1, Et+1 = 1, Jt = 1), and the conditional variance V ar(ẽt+1−ẽt−1|Et−1 = 1, Et+1 = 1, Jt = 1))
are reproduced very accurately by the model. We also consider the covariance between an
employment residual (from a linear probability model) and the wage residual, separately
for stayers and movers. They help capture the selection effect of employment decisions on
21All units are in logs.
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Table 7: Model Fit for a Selection of Moments on Wage Dynamics
At least some College High School or Less
Data Model Data Model
Residual wage growth moments for job stayers
V ar(∆ẽt|Et−1 = 1, Et = 1, Jt = 0) 0.0344 0.0275 0.0250 0.0227
Cov(∆ẽt,∆ẽt−1|Jt = 0) -0.0047 0.0030 -0.0035 -0.0009
Skewness(∆ẽt|Et−1 = 1, Et = 1, Jt = 0) 0.0154 0.0175 0.1925 0.1943
Kurtosis(∆ẽt|Et−1 = 1, Et = 1, Jt = 0) 6.0813 6.0949 6.5075 6.5038
Residual wage growth moments for job movers
E(ẽt+1 − ẽt−1|Et−1 = 1, Et = 1, Jt = 1) 0.0400 0.0394 0.0266 0.0259
V ar(ẽt+1 − ẽt−1|Et−1 = 1, Et = 1, Jt = 1) 0.0668 0.0689 0.0537 0.0565
Covariance between wage growth and employment residuals
Cov(ũt, ẽt|Et = Et−1 = 1, Jt = 0) 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002
Cov(ũt, ẽt|Et = Et−1 = 1, Jt = 1) 0.0192 0.0211 0.0031 0.0060
Common shocks at the firm level
Spatial correlation coefficient (for stayers) 0.1822 0.1883 0.1783 0.1785
Cov(Ej [∆ẽt],Ej [∆ẽt−1]|Jt = 0) -0.0015 0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0021
V: Variance, C: Covariance, E: average, Ej : average within firm j. ẽt is the estimated wage residual at age
t. ũt is a residual from a linear probability regression for employment. Et = 1 indicates employment, Jt = 1
denotes a job mover between period t − 1 and t. Kurtosis and Skewness drop top and bottom 1% of wage
growth observations.
wages.
Among the moments we consider are the skewness and kurtosis of wage growth for stayers.
These two moments capture the possibility of non normality, one interpretation of which is
that most wage adjustments are small but occasionally we see big changes, say because of a
promotion or an important adverse effect on productivity; we will discuss this below when
we look at the estimated parameters. Skewness is close to zero, but kurtosis is relatively
high. Both these moments are fitted very well by the model.
In the last panel of Table 7 we show two moments designed to capture the co-movement
of wage growth among stayers in a firm; these moments identify the transmission coeffi-
cients and are thus of central importance. These are the spatial correlation of wage shocks
and the autocovariance of average wage growth. Since we measure these moments using
residual wage growth they are unlikely to reflect correlation in wages due to sorting of sim-
ilar workers into a firm. Rather, they reflect how changes in wages are correlated across
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individuals, reflecting the influence of firm-level shocks. This spatial correlation is quite
high: 0.18 for both education groups and this is closely reproduced by the model. Simi-
larly, the model accurately matches the autocovariance of average wage growth within firms
(Cov(Ej[∆ẽt],Ej[∆ẽt−1]|Jt = 0)). In sum, the model captures rather well the way wages of
workers in the same workplace move together from period to period.
In Table 8 we report the fit of the model for labor market transitions. Again, the model
does a good job of capturing the age profile of entry and job mobility (including the het-
erogeneity by education), which are all declining over the life cycle. It also fits the non-
employment rate exactly for the lower education group and slightly under predicts it for
people with more education over 40, although not in an economically consequential way.
Importantly, the model replicates the increasing participation over the lifecycle. It does,
however, overpredict job separation for the youngest higher education group. Since in equa-
tion (10) we let job-to-job transition probabilities differ according to firm size and sector of
origin, we add moments that capture such heterogeneity, namely the proportion of movers
to a different industry, different firm size type, or both. The model captures extremely well
such transitions as shown in the lower part of Table 8.
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Table 8: Model Fit for Moments on Labor Market Transitions
At least some college High School or Less
Age Data Model Data Model
Unemployment frequency
26-30 0.1220 0.1229 0.1644 0.1610
31-35 0.0980 0.1027 0.1347 0.1325
36-40 0.0900 0.0827 0.1234 0.1231
41-45 0.0874 0.0752 0.1154 0.1155
46-50 0.0862 0.0777 0.1061 0.1050
51-55 0.0862 0.0921 0.0961 0.0984
Job creation frequency
26-30 0.2400 0.2226 0.1806 0.1768
31-35 0.1945 0.2016 0.1659 0.1689
36-40 0.1699 0.1816 0.1562 0.1594
41-45 0.1548 0.1591 0.1480 0.1510
46-50 0.1377 0.1348 0.1409 0.1425
51-55 0.1231 0.1135 0.1367 0.1345
Job separation frequency
26-30 0.0194 0.0326 0.0283 0.0285
31-35 0.0152 0.0220 0.0215 0.0253
36-40 0.0134 0.0157 0.0192 0.0219
41-45 0.0126 0.0128 0.0175 0.0193
46-50 0.0120 0.0118 0.0158 0.0164
51-55 0.0119 0.0125 0.0149 0.0143
Job mobility frequency
26-30 0.0458 0.0472 0.0336 0.0345
31-35 0.0385 0.0347 0.0280 0.0278
36-40 0.0319 0.0261 0.0241 0.0232
41-45 0.0271 0.0212 0.0210 0.0193
46-50 0.0227 0.0193 0.0182 0.0167
51-55 0.0191 0.0182 0.0160 0.0146
Pr(E-to-E to new industry) 0.3573 0.3572 0.3372 0.3376
Pr(E-to-E to new firm size) 0.5066 0.5062 0.4779 0.4803
Pr(E-to-E to new industry and new size) 0.2144 0.2137 0.2118 0.2119
Note: All transitions are quarterly
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5.2 Parameter estimates
Transitions We start by presenting results in Table 9 for the decisions to work and to
move to another firm.22 Starting with employment, we find the expected increasing concave
pattern in age (the δ parameters). The association of wages with participation is given by
the coefficient φ in the table. The coefficient is positive and significant, with a notably higher
value for high skill workers.23
To interpret the size of the coefficient we report at the bottom of the table the marginal
effect of a wage increase on employment. This turns out to be much higher for higher
educated workers than the rest, implying a stronger combined effect of self-selection and
incentives for the higher skilled group.
Table 9: Participation and job mobility
At least some College High School or Less
Parameter Estimate s.e. Estimate s.e.
Employment
δ0 Constant 0.251 (0.004) 1.839 (0.001)
δage Age 0.807 (0.002) -0.015 (0.0004)
δage2 Age squared -0.080 (0.0002) 0.016 (0.0001)
φ Wage residual 0.763 (0.003) 0.268 (0.0012)
Marginal Effect of 10% wage change (%) 0.273 0.133
Job-to-job Mobility
θ0 Constant -0.829 (0.013) -2.579 (0.006)
θage Age -0.514 (0.006) 0.448 (0.0023)
θage2 Age squared 0.058 (0.0007) -0.074 (0.0003)
b Wage improvement 2.865 (0.054) 1.501 (0.041)
Marginal Effect of 10% wage improvement (%) 1.711 0.871
In the bottom part of Table 9 we look at the determinants of job-to-job mobility. We
find that transitions across firms are decreasing in age, matching what we see in the data.
22The results from the first step to obtain estimates of the effects of individual characteristics on wages
(γ) and the wage residuals (ẽ) are presented in the Appendix.
23As noted earlier, this is a mix of a selection and an incentive effect and in this context we have no way
of distinguishing the two, because we do not have appropriate exclusion restrictions. Nevertheless this is not
a threat to the identification of the stochastic process of wages, which is the central focus of this study.
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Table 10: Estimation Results




λentry Arr. rate at entry 0.977 0.744
(0.0012) (0.0005)
λU,0 Arr. rate, subs. spells 0.367 0.221
(0.0005) (0.0002)
λU,age Arr. rate, subs. spells (age shift) 0.0047 0.0016
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Origin of offer
Parameter Description Estimate Estimate
(s.e.) (s.e.)
ω0 Different firm size & sector 0.210 0.213
(0.0002) (0.0001)
ω0 + ω1 Different size, same sector 0.284 0.266
(0.0002) (0.0001)
ω0 + ω2 Same size, different sector 0.144 0.124
(0.0002) (0.0001)
ω0 + ω1 + ω2 Same size, same sector 0.362 0.397
- -
The coefficient b is estimated to be large and positive, which shows that mobility choices
are influenced by the wage difference between incumbent and poaching firm; this is true for
both education levels. This limits the ability of the incumbent firm to lower wages as a
result of shocks. However, mobility is not driven by wages only. Mobility costs that vary
by age also matter, as do random exogenous shocks. This is important when we consider
structural models of mobility because it suggests that wage concerns are only a part of the
story driving job changes.
Table 10 presents information on the transition process between jobs and sectors. High
skilled workers have a substantially higher probability of job offers at labor market entry,
λentry, implying a faster integration in the labor market post education. The arrival rate of
job offers over the life-cycle implies that at age 30, one job is sampled approximately every
2.9 quarters for the high skilled and every 4.9 quarters for lower skill workers. These rates
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decrease in frequency as workers age, but very moderately. However, there is an age profile
in labor force participation, induced by the age profile shown in Table 9.
In the bottom half of Table 10, the coefficients ωk (k = {0, 1, 2}) show how offers to
different firm types and industries vary. They imply that sampling jobs from other sectors
is smaller than from the same sector.24
Stochastic process of individual productivity We first consider the stochastic process
of wages that is unrelated to firms and which the worker carries from job to job. This is shown
in Table 11. There are clear similarities across education groups, but also some important
differences as we would expect when considering Figure 2.
Table 11: The stochastic process of individual productivity
At least some College High School or Less
Parameter Estimate st. error Estimate st. error
σε Transitory shock, wages 0.051 (0.0013) 0.068 (0.0007)
ρ AR(1) coefficient 0.971 (0.0001) 0.962 (0.0001)
σP Initial perm. productivity, wages 0.335 (0.0002) 0.303 (0.0003)
Mixture of normals for persistent productivity shocks
µζ1 mean of distribution 1 0.0008 (0.0000) -0.0014 (0.0000)
σζ1 standard dev. of distribution 1 0.0006 (0.0003) 0.011 (0.0007)
µζ2 mean of distribution 2 -0.007 - 0.017 -
σζ2 standard dev. of distribution 2 0.280 (0.0007) 0.281 (0.0006)
λm Probability of distribution 1 0.897 (0.0007) 0.924 (0.0007)
Wages at labor market entry show a remarkable amount of dispersion (as measured by
σP ). Thereafter the shocks are quite persistent. However, recall that the autocorrelation
coefficient ρ is quarterly, which implies that wages are not a random walk for either of the
two groups. For example, after 10 years only 30% of a shock to high education workers
remains; for the low education group 21% of the shock remains after that amount of time.
24In the current version of the paper we have not explored the implications of such persistence because we
have not allowed wage growth to depend on firm size or sector. We intend to consider this issue in future
work in more detail.
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A feature of the wage data is heavy tails; one interpretation of this is that workers
occasionally obtain large wage increases, possibly reflecting promotions, while otherwise
there are small fluctuations reflecting small adjustments to pay possibly because of sickness
or other events. To capture this we allow the distribution of individual productivity shocks
to be a mixture of Normals, which allows for very general structure of moments. As we
showed in the section on the model fit we are indeed able to match the observed kurtosis of
wages. In Table 11 we show the estimated parameters of the mixture (µζs , σζs , s=1,2 and
λm). The key feature here is that with some low probability the individual draws a shock
from a distribution with a very high standard deviation. Thus for the higher education group
with a probability of 0.1 (1− λm) the individual draws an idiosyncratic productivity shock
with a standard deviation of 0.28. Otherwise the shock standard deviation is very small
(0.0006). The result is very similar for the lower education group, except that the standard
deviation in the more frequent regime is higher (0.011). Individual productivity shocks are
only a part of the story driving wage fluctuations. The next key component are firm level
shocks, to which we now turn.
Table 12: Shocks and their transmission
At least some College High School or Less
Parameter Description Estimate s.e. Estimate s.e.
κT Transitory firm shock, match value 0.1031 (0.0014) 0.1931 (0.0002)
κP Permanent firm shock, match value 0.3105 (0.0013) 0.0810 (0.0017)
σψT Transitory idiosyncratic shock, match value 0.0009 (0.0004) 0.0071 (0.0008)
σψP Permanent idiosyncratic shock, match value 0.0003 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0001)
σψinit Permanent initial shock, match value 0.0056 (0.0006) 0.0775 (0.0010)
Note: The standard deviation of the transitory firm-level shock is 0.4758; the standard deviation of the permanent firm-level
shock is 0.1303.
Match value and transmission of shocks In Table 12 we show the key parameters
for our study, namely the transmission of firm-related shocks onto wages. For workers with
higher education 10% of a transitory shock is transmitted to workers. This is is not large
but still substantial and given the size of our data set the impact is highly significant.
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Permanent shocks, on the other hand, are transmitted to a much larger extent, with 31% of
a firm permanent shock being transmitted to wages. Thus when the fortunes of firms change
permanently, they change the wages of high skill workers permanently (or at least until job
separation), implying a high degree of rent sharing. This result is qualitatively consistent
with Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) (see below for a more quantitative comparison
highlighting the importance of accounting for job mobility and periods out of work). The
implication of this result is of considerable firm level market power, allowing the firm to
adjust wages to reflect its fortunes. We also experimented with allowing for an asymmetric
impact of shocks, depending on whether they were positive or negative, but we were not
able to detect any difference. This is also a strong result because it points to mechanisms of
rent sharing, rather than the results of credible renegotiation as in Lise, Meghir, and Robin
(2016). In that model an improvement in the productivity of the firm should not lead to
increased wages because workers do not have a credible threat to quit: if they were happy
with their wage before they should continue to be so following the improvements of the firm’s
fortunes.
The story is quite different for lower skill workers. Their wages fluctuate quite sub-
stantially in response to transitory shocks in the firm’s value added (a 19% transmission
coefficient) but much less so in response to permanent shocks, where the effect is only 8%.
This may indicate a stronger level of competition in the lower skill market, as well as wages
closer to reservation values, which do not allow for large reductions without workers quit-
ting. It may also reflect more union protection against structural revisions in pay. From an
econometric point of view this result may be traced back to the fact that overall permanent
shocks are less important for low skill workers, as implied by the descriptive analysis of their
lifecycle variance, which does not increase, in contrast to that of the higher skill workers.
The remaining coefficients in Table 12 relate to the idiosyncratic match value. This is
a component of wage variation that relates to the specific worker firm match, but is purely
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idiosyncratic to the pair and is not shared in equal measure by similar workers within the
firm (unlike the ”rent sharing” component we commented on above). In settings where in-
formation on firm performance is missing, this distinction is lost, while it plays an important
role here and can be separately identified from the impact of firm level shocks.25
The results here indicate a relatively small role for initial heterogeneity in idiosyncratic
match effects for higher skill workers: the variance of the initial match value is very small,
which also implies that wage induced moves from one job to another are primarily driven
by an accumulation of bad shocks in the job of origin, rather than a location of a much
improved opportunity. The permanent shocks to this initial match value (σψP ) are much
smaller than permanent productivity shocks (see Table 11). Finally, transitory shocks to
the matched value (σψT ) although substantial, are small compared to idiosyncratic shocks
to individual productivity in Table 11.
When we turn to lower skill workers there seems to be a larger role for an initial variance
of offers (0.0775), but beyond that idiosyncratic match effects are effectively zero, playing
no role in the variance of wage growth. The important point that emerges from these results
is that a large fraction of ”match effects” on wage variability is explained by shocks to firm
productivity rather than more idiosyncratic components reflecting, say, learning or wage
improvements due to between-firm competition for workers.
To summarize, our results are not driven by omitted match specific effects, but by the firm
level shocks that are observed and by the spatial correlation of wages between workers in a
firm. Allowing for idiosyncratic match value is not particularly important: match specificity
originates from productivity shocks and essentially relates to non-competitive behavior in the
labor market that allows both for rent sharing and a pass-through of negative fluctuations.
Such non competitive behavior seems to be much more important for workers with higher





The identity of the firm in which one works appears to have a substantial impact on the
evolution of wages over the lifecycle, pointing to non-competitive behavior. Given that we
are looking at innovations to wages and productivity, our conclusion is that a substantial
amount of uncertainty faced by individuals has its origins in the fluctuating fortunes of their
firm. This is beyond the issues of sorting that other authors have identified and relates to the
level of wages and firm productivity. In order to better understand the implications of these
results we carry out a number of simulations of actual and counterfactual lifecycle profiles.
We simulate the life-cycle for 40,000 individuals. To start off the lifecycle, individuals
receive an initial offer with probability λentry in the first period. We allocate these offers
across individuals according to the cross-sectional distribution of workers in different sector
and firm-size bins as reported in Table 2. We then analyze wage dispersion, participation
and mobility over the life-cycle for the full model and in counterfactual scenarios in which
we shut down different types of shocks subsequently. For simplicity, we report statistics for
four points in the life cycle: age 26, 35, 45 and 55.
In Panel A of Table 13 we consider the baseline model with endogenous participation
and mobility choices. As we expect from the data, the cross sectional variance of earnings
increases over time for the higher skilled and is flat for the low skilled. We target these
life-cycle patterns in the estimation, and the levels closely match the data as shown above.
In Panel B we switch off firm level shocks (i.e., set the pass-through parameters κP = κT =
0). By the age of 55, the cross sectional variance for the high skilled is only 0.13, compared to
the full variance of 0.19. In other words, permanent firm level shocks, which are transmitted
to wages, explain 32% of the cross-sectional dispersion of wages for 55-year-old workers with
at least some college education. This effect is important because, as documented in Table
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Table 13: Simulations: Firm and Match-Specific Shocks
At least some college High School
Panel A: Full Model
Age Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility
26 0.1104 0.8906 0.0345 0.0954 0.7909 0.0230
35 0.1531 0.9059 0.0249 0.0912 0.8727 0.0252
45 0.1721 0.9220 0.0224 0.0922 0.8901 0.0175
55 0.1869 0.9060 0.0238 0.0930 0.9122 0.0099
Panel B: No Firm Shocks
Age Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility
26 0.1089 0.8902 0.0330 0.0939 0.7906 0.0224
35 0.1306 0.8996 0.0247 0.0877 0.8726 0.0229
45 0.1333 0.9142 0.0240 0.0876 0.8893 0.0169
55 0.1344 0.8927 0.0257 0.0881 0.9123 0.0093
Panel C: No Idiosyncratic Match Effects
Age Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility
26 0.1104 0.8906 0.0343 0.0894 0.7910 0.0219
35 0.1530 0.9059 0.0248 0.0850 0.8709 0.0258
45 0.1722 0.9221 0.0223 0.0856 0.8886 0.0182
55 0.1871 0.9058 0.0237 0.0863 0.9112 0.0099
Panel D: No Firm Shocks, No Match Effects
Age Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility
26 0.1089 0.8903 0.0330 0.0879 0.7905 0.0209
35 0.1306 0.8995 0.0249 0.0813 0.8711 0.0237
45 0.1332 0.9139 0.0240 0.0812 0.8879 0.0171
55 0.1344 0.8924 0.0258 0.0881 0.9109 0.0092
12, it is the permanent shocks that are transmitted, and these accumulate over the life-cycle
to a much larger extent than transitory ones (at least so long as people stay with the firm).
For the lower skill workers, switching off transmission has a much smaller effect, but again
in the same direction: wages would have been slightly less dispersed if it were not for firm
level shocks.
In Panel C we switch off match-specific effects and Panel D eliminates both firm-level
shocks and idiosyncratic match components. As we would expect from the parameter esti-
mates, standard match effects do not contribute to the cross-sectional variance of high-skilled
workers. Perhaps surprisingly, these shocks do not explain much of the overall participation
46
Table 14: Simulations: Mobility and Participation Choices
At least some college High School
Panel A: No Job-to-Job Mobility
Age Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility
26 0.1105 0.8905 0.0000 0.0955 0.7908 0.0000
35 0.1567 0.9016 0.0000 0.0923 0.8712 0.0000
45 0.1860 0.9140 0.0000 0.0933 0.8884 0.0000
55 0.2090 0.8942 0.0000 0.0941 0.9110 0.0000
Panel B: No Job-to-Job Mobility, No Firm Shocks
Age Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility
26 0.1089 0.8902 0.0000 0.0940 0.7905 0.0000
35 0.1306 0.8996 0.0000 0.0877 0.8714 0.0000
45 0.1332 0.9141 0.0000 0.0872 0.8878 0.0000
55 0.1344 0.8926 0.0000 0.0877 0.9112 0.0000
Panel C: Full Participation
Age Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility
26 0.1108 1.0000 0.0395 0.0953 1.0000 0.0306
35 0.1556 1.0000 0.0268 0.0909 1.0000 0.0286
45 0.1768 1.0000 0.0221 0.0921 1.0000 0.0189
55 0.2000 1.0000 0.0218 0.0939 1.0000 0.0101
Panel D: Full Participation, No Firm Shocks
Age Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility Var(Earnings) Participation Mobility
26 0.1092 1.0000 0.0376 0.0939 1.0000 0.0296
35 0.1331 1.0000 0.0279 0.0865 1.0000 0.0262
45 0.1358 1.0000 0.0266 0.0868 1.0000 0.0186
55 0.1383 1.0000 0.0288 0.0871 1.0000 0.0097
or mobility rates by age; this is despite the fact that both of these decisions depend on the
wage and the wage gains from moving, respectively. This is true for both education groups.
The implication of these results is that the low skill labor market looks much more competi-
tive and closer to the standard paradigm than that of the high skill group. This is consistent
with other studies with US data, following a different methodology and data, such as Lise,
Meghir, and Robin (2016).
In Table 14 we explore the role of mobility and participation choices for overall wage
variation. Panel A simulates the model without allowing for job-to-job mobility (implying
that workers can join new firms only after an unemployment spell). The first column illus-
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Table 15: Simulations: Summary
Share of earnings variance accounted for by firm-level shocks
At least some college High School
Age Full Model No Mobility Full Participation Full Model No Mobility Full Participation
26 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015
35 0.172 0.200 0.169 0.040 0.052 0.051
45 0.291 0.396 0.302 0.053 0.070 0.061
55 0.391 0.555 0.446 0.056 0.073 0.078
trates the increase in overall earnings variance compared to the results of the full model in
Panel A of Table 13. If workers cannot switch jobs, either to move to opportunity or to
leave a sinking ship, the simulated cross-sectional earnings variance at age 55 increases by
12% for high-skilled workers but only 1.2% for low-skilled workers. Job mobility is thus an
important earnings (and hence consumption) smoothing mechanism for high skill workers.
Panel B shows that a large part of the increase in wage variance is due to the role
of mobility in mitigating exposure to negative firm-level shocks. Without the option of
switching jobs, firm level shocks account for about 55% of the cross sectional variance, a
much larger share than when workers are allowed to change jobs. For low skill workers this
number is about 7%, so although much less important, it is still a substantial amount.26
Finally, Panel C and D consider the role of non-participation. Intuitively, if workers do
not have the option of leaving their current job into non-participation in response to large
negative shocks, the role of firm-level shocks in explaining overall earnings variation will also
increase substantially compared to the baseline. Indeed quitting and searching for another
job can mitigate the rise in wage inequality over the lifecycle: forcing all individuals to work
increases the variance at age 55 by about 4.5% for the high skill group. However, it has little
to no impact for the lower skill group. Switching off the transmission of firm level shocks
eliminates this impact.
26Note that if the match value is entirely fixed, job mobility does not matter for the earnings variance
because individual productivity shocks are carried over to any other job as well. This means the results on
wage variance and participation from Panel C of Table 13 apply to the case of no mobility as well.
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The various results are summarized in Table 15. The results emphasize the crucial role
of the firm in determining careers and how mobility and participation choices can mitigate
some of these effects. These endogenous choices mask the high transmission of firm-level
shocks to workers’ wages. This is a crucial insight that helps explain the larger transmission
effects that we find compared to the previous literature. Focusing only on the set of workers
who choose not to adjust along these two margins systematically underestimates the role of
firms for earnings variation.
The role of selection To illustrate this point further, in Table 16 we compare results
obtained in the baseline model (“Full model”) with those obtained in a counterfactual model
where we only focus on stayers, similar to Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) (GPS) and
most of the literature that followed. The table shows how the estimated firm contribution to
the variance of wage growth differs in our model and in that of GPS. For example, our model
implies that the standard deviation of wage growth for stayers attributable to permanent
firm shocks is 0.055. The GPS model implies a much smaller contribution of 0.033. Overall
for high skilled workers the firms contribute 32% of the variance of wage growth, while the
implied number in GPS is almost half at 18%. Thus selection plays a very strong role in
censoring the impact of the firm. For lower skill workers this is less of an issue because the
role of the firm is much reduced.
Thus, focusing on stayers gives the impression of a much lower transmission rate of firm
shocks to wages, which in turn implies a bias towards more competitive labor markets. The
downward bias is particularly large for the high educated since for this group the transmission
of permanent firm shocks is higher and these shocks have a larger cumulative effect on
lifecycle variances than transitory firm shocks. This has important considerations for an
evaluation of lifecycle risks faced by workers, since most firm-level shocks are not under the
control of the agent. Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2017, 2018) use this insight to study
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Table 16: Simulations: Mobility and Participation Choices
At least some College High School
Full Model Stayers Full Model Stayers
sd(∆w|J = 0) 0.1855 0.1855 0.1581 0.1581
sd(∆w firm trans) 0.0248 0.0072 0.0479 0.0261
sd(∆w firm perm) 0.0546 0.0334 0.0059 0.0258
sd(∆w firm) 0.0601 0.0342 0.0483 0.0367
Share firm shocks 0.324 0.184 0.306 0.232
how exogenous permanent firm shocks passing through wages impact household savings and
portfolio choices, respectively.
6 Conclusion
The extent to which the firm in which a person works is a factor in their wages and their
fluctuations is an important question both from the perspective of understanding the degree
of labor markets competitiveness and to identify the sources and nature of uncertainty that
individuals face. In this paper we use rich matched employer-employee data from Sweden
to estimate the stochastic properties of the wage process for individuals and the way it
may be impacted by productivity shocks to the firm, directly addressing this question. Our
model accounts for endogenous participation and mobility decisions and thus deals with the
potential truncation in the impact of productivity shocks on wages that is induced by people
quitting into unemployment or changing employer.
The key finding is that permanent productivity shocks transmit to individual wages for
high skill workers: the elasticity of wages with respect to permanent firm productivity shocks
is 0.31. In other words firms pass a third of their permanent change in their fortunes to wages.
However transitory (i.i.d.) shocks have no impact on the wages of high skill workers. They
do however affect the wages of the low skill workers with an elasticity of 0.19; yet, this does
not have a large impact on wage profiles. We find that the variance of wages increases over
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the life-cycle for high skill workers. By age 55 about 39% of the cross sectional variance of
wages for high skill workers is attributable to firm level shocks. For these workers, match
specific effects, other than those that are common to all workers in the same firm, do not
play a substantial role. On the other hand, for lower skill workers we find that the firm has
a much lower impact, with wages not depending much either on firm level shocks or even on
idiosyncratic match specific effects. For them about 5.6% of the cross sectional variance can
be attributed to the firm by age 55.
Our paper emphasizes that there are three sources of stochastic variation in wages that
are often confounded (mostly due to imperfect data). The first is purely idiosyncratic to
the worker and is transferred across jobs. It varies over time due to transitory and per-
manent components - for example because of short-lived spells of sickness or long-lasting
skill depreciation. The second is specific to the match and can potentially also vary over
the life of the worker-firm relationship, due again to short-term or long-term developments
(such as learning or between firm competition for talents). Finally, there is an insurance
or rent-sharing component that depends on how much the fortunes of a firm make their
way onto the workers’ wages. By its very nature, this component induces correlation across
wages of similar workers within the firm. It would be unimportant in settings in which labor
markets were perfectly competitive. It would also be absent in settings in which institu-
tional features (such as union contracts) prevent wages from absorbing firm-side fluctuations
(while allowing for industry-wide developments to matter, say). Our results show that the
firm-level component plays a more important role than the match component (which only
explains initial heterogeneity of job offers among the low skilled). They also provide evidence
that this affects the wages of workers of different skills differently. Highly skilled workers
partake of the structural changes occurring in the firm’s fortunes, while low-skilled workers
are insulated from them. This is consistent with union protection being more important
for these workers. Indeed, one way of interpreting the results is that the wages of low-skill
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workers are close to the minimum wage thresholds set in collective bargaining agreements,
reducing the transmission of negative firm-level shocks onto wages.27
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A Wage Residuals
The results for the first-stage estimation are presented in Table 17. For readability, we
suppress region FE, time FE and region-time interactions in the participation equation, and
region effects as well as industry-time FE in the wage regression.
First, consider the results for participation choices in Table 17. Column (1) reports
the results for workers with high school education or less. Column (3) reports the results
for workers with at least some college. The results are probit estimates, and we focus on
their sign patterns. For both groups, having children up to three years of age significantly
decreases the probability of participating in the labor market, but older children increase
participation.
Temporary absence is facilitated by the Swedish system of parental leave benefits that
offers 80% of previous wages for up to 13 months with a very generous cap. The full benefit
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Table 17: First-Stage Results: Participation and Log wages
High School of less Some College
Participation Log wages Participation Log wages
age 0.4066 0.3288 0.6457 0.7442
(0.019) (0.004) (0.033) (0.010)
age2 -0.3814 -0.1997 -0.7058 -0.4223
(0.025) (0.004) (0.045) (0.010)
age3 0.1655 0.0617 0.2967 0.1259
(0.013) (0.002) (0.023) (0.005)
age4 -0.0229 -0.0072 -0.0413 -0.0148
(0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001)
child 0-3 yrs -0.0492 -0.0344 0.0087 -0.0114
(0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
child 4-6 yrs 0.0234 -0.0021 0.0626 0.0278
(0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001)
child 7-10 yrs 0.0192 -0.0047 0.0598 0.0208
(0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
child 11-17 yrs 0.0677 0.0107 0.1211 0.0373
(0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
married 0.3236 0.0996 0.2089 0.1334
(0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
parental leave 0.0184 -0.0369 0.0309 -0.0357
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
sickness benefits -0.0933 -0.0739 -0.1010 -0.1023
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Mills ratio 0.4966 1.0987
(0.007) (0.021)
Mills ratio * age -0.1941 -0.4552
(0.006) (0.020)
Mills ratio * age2e 0.0459 0.0849
(0.002) (0.006)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE No Yes No Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-Year FE Yes No Yes No
Observations 31,091,423 7,114,874 11,188,448 2,643,040
R-squared 0.074 0.162 0.041 0.173
Wald test [df=220] 19425.29 5881.99
Wald test [p-value] 0.0000 0.0000
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Wald tests report test statistics and p-values for the exclusion
restriction of region-time interactions in each specification. We use a Probit model for participation and
report the Pseudo R-Squared.
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period only applies if the father also stays with the child for some time, which is consistent
with the lower participation probability for men with young children. Interestingly, married
men are more likely to work in general.
The coefficients on parental leave and sickness benefits confirm the measurement problems
in employment status described above. In particular, parental leave payments increase the
probability of being employed. The reason is that men usually only take out parental leave
benefits for a few months. Yet employers are likely to add some bonus payments during this
time, which makes these fathers appear working at low wages. The coefficient for sickness
benefits is negative and significant for both education groups, but a similar caveat applies:
Short time sickness benefits will make individuals appear to be working nevertheless, but at
a lower average wage.
Next, consider the results for wages in columns (2) and (4) of Table 17 respectively. The
results confirm the familiar concave life-cycle profile of wages. The predicted wage profiles
across the lifecycle are illustrated graphically in the top row of Figure 5. As we can see from
the comparison with simple OLS wages profiles, the model predicts that selection has an
effect on the slope of the wages profile. Positive selection into the labor market is stronger
at early ages, which means that without selection correction, wage growth at the beginning
of the life-cycle will be underestimated by looking at cross-sectional worker data as lower
ability individuals enter the labor force later. This is an important finding that needs to
be taken into account for analyses of wage inequality for example. Furthermore, we find
increasing positive selection at the end of workers’ careers again. One explanation could be
early retirement based on disability, which is very common in Sweden and is more likely to
be chosen by low-ability types. As a result, the wage decrease in the life-cycle of wages is
underestimated.
To illustrate selection patterns across the lifecycle, we allow for a fairly flexible speci-
fication of the Mills ratio in the wage regression. The overall selection coefficients by age
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corresponding to the regression results in Table 17 can be found in the second row of Figure
5. For both education groups, selection is highest early in the life-cycle and decreases over
time as lower-productivity types enter the labor market. Finally selection increases again
as workers get closer to retirement age. These patterns directly mirror the results for wages
profiles taking selection into account. Overall, the wage regression implies a positive and
significant selection effect for both samples. As the average selection effects by age in the
third row of Figure 5 suggest, wage differences because of selection are in the range of 0-20%,
where these effects are higher for highly educated workers.
B Deriving Standard Errors
Define an outcome k relevant for period t and individual i as ykit. This could be the log
wage or the log wage squared or the log wage in t multiplied by the log wage in period t− 1.
The expected value of this moment given the model is denoted by E(ykit) = gk(θ). This is







where Tki the number of observations over time used for moment k for the case of individual
i, Nk is the number of individuals used in computing moment k.







where gkit(θ) is a function defined by the model and predicting an individual level outcome
such as participation or mobility. The ̂ denotes the fact that this is a simulated object. Given
the data for each individual we can use many simulations to improve the approximation and
58
mitigate simulation error. We henceforth drop the ̂ for simplicity of notation and assume
that there are enough simulations to make simulation errror negligible.
We associate a weight with each moment. Denote the k × k weight matrix by Ω with
diagonal element ωk. The average of these predictions is the finite sample model counterpart
of the moment we are fitting as defined above.







Define the k × 1 vector of moments as g(θ) and the k × p matrix of first derivatives by
G(θ). The k-th row is denoted by g′k(θ) and is a 1× p vector.













(θ̂ − θ0) = 0
which gives





Hence the variance of the method of moments estimator is
































where G is the k × p matrix of first derivatives of the moments. The k-th row contains the
derivatives of of the k-th moment with respect to all parameters.




with g(θ̂) being the vector of moments from the model evaluated at the estimated parame-
ters θ̂ and ĝ being their data counterparts. Hence the covariance matrix for the estimated
parameters is given by









for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation












For variables such as frequency of unemployment at age a we have that
vkia = ykia − gkia(θ̂)
where ykia is the value of the outcome (say unemployed or not) for person i in period t when
their age is a and all other variables that enter the moment are evaluated at the value for
person i in period when they are age a. If a is an interval say 26-30 then the person will
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appear five times, possibly with other conditioning variables (if present) taking on different
values each time. While a will not change the other predictive variables may change. For
variables such as V (∆ẽt|Et−1 = 1, Et = 1, Jt = 0) we will get
vkit = (ẽit − ẽit−1)2 − (predicted amount for this object by model for person i in period t)
This will be operative for the periods where the conditions are true and this will define




= 0 so long as there is because once we
have imposed independence across individuals the numerator will be of order N while the
denominator of order N2.





























l∈j,k 6=l(∆ẽkt −∆ē)(∆ẽlt −∆ē)
V ar(∆ẽit)
∑
j nj(nj − 1)
One approach would be to assume that all the independent variation comes from between
firms. Then denoting
ρ∆ẽ − gρ(θ̂) = ΣMj=1vj
where M is the number of firms. Then the variance for this residual will be
V ar(ρ∆ẽ − gρ(θ̂)) =̃ ΣMj=1v2j
Similarly the covariance of ρ∆ẽ − gρ(θ̂) with the other elements of g(θ̂)− ĝ.
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